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industry as a whole.  Similar to the lack of consistency in how healthcare, 
health care, or health-care is spelled,2 varying opinions about hospital 
mergers and the uncertainty caused by antitrust laws create a miasma that
continues to hover around the industry.3 
Currently, hospitals across the nation participate in the largest wave of 
mergers since the 1990s with the idea that “[b]ig is going to be better.
Small is not going to survive.”4  Considering the dynamic attributes and 
various forces pushing the healthcare market towards consolidation and 
integration, hospitals increasingly participate in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) with other medical practices.5  Experts note that hospital transactions
are so widespread that many are predicting the demise of the independent 
hospital.6  In 2015 alone, the number of hospital transactions announced 
grew 18% compared to 2014 and 70% compared to 2010.7 
2. “Health care” is in the top 20% of the most searched words in the Merriam-
Webster’s online dictionary. Healthcare Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/healthcare [https://perma.cc/CWL5-3QKT] (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017); see also Michael Millenson, “Healthcare” vs. “Health Care”: The Definitive Word(s), 
THE DOCTOR WEIGHS IN (Aug. 29, 2010), http://thedoctorweighsin.com/healthcare-vs-
health-care-the-definitive-words/ [https://perma.cc/A7CQ-99MQ] (discussing the various 
rationales for the correct spelling of health care).
3. See Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, New Laws and Rising Costs Create a Surge 
of Supersizing Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
08/13/business/bigger-hospitals-may-lead-to-bigger-bills-for-patients.html. 
4. Ann Twomey, When It Comes to Hospitals: Is Bigger Better?, OBSERVER (Apr.
15, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://observer.com/2015/04/when-it-comes-to-hospitals-is-bigger-
better/ [https://perma.cc/5ULJ-GEAE].
5. See id.; see also Balancing Act: Consolidation and Antitrust Issues in Health 
Care, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND. (June 2015), http://chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY 
%20Files/PDF/PDF%20B/PDF%20BalancingConsolidationAntitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CZ9Y-989V].
6. Bill Woodson, Behind Healthcare’s M&A Boom, FORTUNE, (Aug. 18, 2015, 
11:05 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/18/healthcare-ma-aetna-anthem-cigna/ [https://perma.cc/
QX3Z-G24N].
7. Kaufman, Hall & Associates, Hospital Merger and Acquisition Activity Up
Sharply in 2015, According to Kaufman Hall Analysis, http://www.kaufmanhall.com/ 
about/news/hospital-merger-and-acquisition-activity-up-sharply-in-2015-according-to-
kaufman-hall-analysis [https://perma.cc/79E6-RZ84] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“In 2015, 
112 hospital transactions were announced compared with 95 transactions in 2014 and 66
in 2010. The pace of transactions was especially strong in the second half of 2015.”). 
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Although critics say hospitals justify mergers in the same way as they 
did during the M&A boom of the 1990s,8 these critics frequently link the 
current wave of mergers with the purpose of becoming more integrated
and efficient to achieve the level of cost savings and improved quality that 
the United States and patients currently require.9  However, the results 
from hospital consolidation remain uncertain because of the limited and 
mixed evidence about its impact on quality of care and price.10  Part I of
this Article discusses the recent surge in hospital M&A activity.11  Part II
brings some clarity by discussing the most frequently cited justification to
this current wave of mergers—the Affordable Care Act (ACA).12 
Concurrently, with the uncertainty surrounding the ever-changing healthcare
landscape and the rising number of hospital transactions, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) (collectively, 
the Agencies) apply an increased level of scrutiny on modern healthcare
transactions.13 
While both public and private forces fuel the drive toward hospital 
consolidation, the Agencies enforce a myriad of roadblocks to hospital 
8. Scott Gottlieb & Patrick Pilch, The Urge to Merge in Healthcare: This Time, 




 10. See WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.,
HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL
CARE? 2–10 (Feb. 2006), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/
rwjf12056/subassets/rwjf12056_1 [https://perma.cc/77RU-DJVD].  Some studies show that
increases in hospital M&A reduce competition and thereby raise prices, although others show 
that hospital consolidation is necessary to reduce costs and improve health care quality.
See, e.g., UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FOUND. OF CONN., HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATIONS AND
CONVERSIONS 12 (2014), http://universalhealthct.org/images/publications/Hospital_
Consolidations_and_Conversions.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNJ6-56FH] (noting that “the most
comprehensive studies showed limited differences in outcomes between consolidated and 
non-consolidated hospital systems”); Gregory Curfman, M.D., Everywhere, Hospitals Are
Merging—But Why Should We Care?, HARV. HEALTH PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 1, 2015, 5:00
PM), http://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/everywhere-hospitals-are-merging-but-why-should-
you-care-201504017844 [https://perma.cc/Q864-C3EY].
11. See infra Part I. 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. Sandra M. DiVarco, The Top Five Traps in Health Care M&A Transactions, 
NAT’L. L. REV. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/top-five-traps-health- 
care-ma-transactions [https://perma.cc/K486-LAD6].  Recently, the Obama administration
identified merger enforcement as one of its top priorities, and the FTC has also illustrated
a newfound aggression in its antitrust enforcement efforts. See id. 
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mergers. Although hospital executives and the Agencies alike direct their 
actions towards the broad goal of improving health care, their independent 
actions are dissimilar and have uncertain results.14  Beyond the uncertainty
caused by the ACA and the dynamic healthcare industry, Part III focuses 
on antitrust law and its framework as applied to previous hospital mergers,
illustrating how courts add more confusion to an already uncertain field 
by applying unclear antitrust laws.15  Part IV attempts to bring some clarity
by shedding light on the court’s most recent analysis of a hospital merger.16 
Instead of applying the per se or “Rule of Reason” approach, this Article 
proposes that, in theory, courts now slide along the analytical continuum 
by using a quick look approach to scrutinize hospital mergers, which increases 
the amount of uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding hospital M&A. 
I. THE RECENT SURGE IN HOSPITAL M&A ACTIVITY
Consolidation has transformed nearly every U.S. industry—the health-
care industry is no different.17  After decades of attempting to deal with 
the causes and effects of hospital consolidation, this controversial trend 
continues to grow.18  In 2015, 112 hospital transactions were announced,19 
which is an increase from the average of 88.4 hospital transactions 
announced each year from 2010 to 2014.20  Furthermore, in the second 
quarter of 2015, the dollar volume of hospital transactions increased
approximately $1.5 billion from the $542 million in the second quarter of
2014.21  The hospital sector’s deal volume also increased approximately 
 14. Ayla Ellison, Should Hospitals Merge to Improve Care, Lower Costs?, BECKER’S 
HOSP. REV. (Sep. 16, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-
and-valuation/should-hospitals-merge-to-improve-care-lower-costs.html [https://perma.cc/
4QQT-5X3G].
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See infra Part IV. 
17. Mitch Morris, Health Care Current: November 12, 2013 The Dilemma of M&A




 19. See Kaufman, Hall & Associates, supra note 7.  These transactions are occurring 
across a broad range of acute-care segments.  In 2015, twenty-eight of the 112 transactions 
announced the acquiring entity was for-profit; in eighty-three transactions, the acquiring
entity was not-for-profit; and in one transaction, a not-for-profit and for-profit organization
jointly acquired an organization. Id.
20. There were sixty-six, eighty-eight, ninety-five, ninety-eight, and ninety-five announced
hospital transactions in years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. Id. 
21. See PWC’S DEALS PRACTICE, Q2 2015 US HEALTH SERVICES DEALS INSIGHT 5
(Aug. 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/publications/assets/pwc-health-services- 
deals-insights-q2-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXY4-N7D8]. 
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38% between the second and third quarter of 2015.22  Along with a huge
growth in multi-hospital systems in which systems acquire individual 
hospitals, increases of mega-hospital-chain mergers are also prevalent.23 
As an example, the largest deal announced in 2015 was the merger of two
non-profit, Catholic healthcare systems, which would form one of the 
largest non-profit healthcare systems in the country,24 with a combined 
$17.6 billion in revenue.25 Another notable hospital transaction announced in
2015 was Ventas, Inc.’s $1.75 billion bid on Ardent Health Services.26 As 
these examples illustrate, hospital mergers are a big part of the industry
and are making an even bigger splash compared to previous waves of hospital
mergers.27 
Generally, professionals projected that 2016 would bring great change 
in the healthcare industry.28  But, as noted before, with change comes
 22. See PWC’S DEAL PRACTICE, Q3 2015 US HEALTH SERVICES DEALS INSIGHT 5–6
(Nov. 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/publications/assets/pwc-health-services- 
deals-insights-q3-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6DZ-F8YU]. 
23. See Ryan Mcaskill, Hospital Sector Embraces Consolidation Over ‘Mega-
Mergers,’  REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 21, 2014), http://revcycleintelligence.com/news/
hospital-sector-embraces-consolidation-mega-mergers [https://perma.cc/W7Z9-FEHM]
(noting the Affordable Care Act has influenced mergers, partnerships, affiliations, and
alliances to effectively compete within the healthcare reform landscape).
24. See, e.g., Gottlieb & Pilch, supra note 8.
 25. See id.  Providence Health & Services signed a letter of intent to merge with St.
Joseph Health, which would include the combination of Providence’s thirty-four hospitals 
and 475 physician clinics and other services with St. Joseph Health’s sixteen hospitals, 
physician organizations, home health agencies, hospice care, outpatient services and 
community outreach services.  Annie Zak, What a Providence-St. Joseph Merger Would
Mean for the Puget Sound Region, BIZJOURNALS (Aug. 4, 2015, 2:37 PM), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/health-care-inc/2015/08/what-a-providence-st-joseph-health- 
merger-would.html [https://perma.cc/Y42X-4RRB]. 
26. Ventas to Acquire Ardent Health Systems for $1.75 Billion, BUS. WIRE (Apr. 6,
2015, 6:33 AM) http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150406005245/en/Ventas-
Acquire-Ardent-Health-Services-1.75-Billion [https://perma.cc/62LY-ZSQY].
27. The last time the United States saw this level of merger and acquisition activity 
among hospitals was in the 1990s when the annual average rate of hospital mergers doubled 
from twelve in the mid-1980s to twenty-four or more.  Gottlieb & Pilch, supra note 8.
 28. PWC’S HEALTH RESEARCH INST., TOP HEALTH INDUSTRY ISSUES OF 2016:
THRIVING IN THE NEW HEALTH ECONOMY 2 (Dec. 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-
industries/top-health-industry-issues/assets/2016-us-hri-top-issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HZR5-TNCT]. For example, millions of American consumers will have their first video
consults.  Healthcare professionals will also begin to conduct e-visits with behavioral health
patients and react to alerts from remote patient monitoring devices.  Additionally, the way 
healthcare is paid for, delivered and accessed will progressively start to echo other industries. 
Id. 
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uncertainty.29  Whether one believes hospital M&A is in spite of or because
of the changes occurring in the healthcare landscape, what remains certain
is that hospital M&A trends will continue to grow.30  Although the true
impact of hospital M&A remains uncertain,31 observers cite healthcare 
pressures, predominately the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
as the main justification behind this recent wave of hospital M&A activity.32 
II. UNCERTAINTY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT BRINGS
 
CLARITY TO HOSPITAL M&A 

Since Congress passed the ACA in 2010, the law has garnered a wide 
variety of political and legal debate.33  Supporters of the ACA believe it “greatly
expands access to healthcare and will over time lower government
spending while boosting the economy.”34  In contrast, opponents believe
the ACA harms the economy, adds to the deficit, and increases the price of 
healthcare.35  Generally, the ACA mandates universal health care coverage
for all U.S. citizens and makes hundreds of regulatory changes as an attempt
29. Uncertainty pervades and motivates every activity related to health care and has
been acknowledged by scholars since the 1950s.  While broadening mass media coverage 
has heightened public interest and confusion, uncertainty in health care has attracted 
increased attention because of several trends and events. See Paul K.J. Han, William M.P.
Klein, & Beraj K. Arora, Varieties of Uncertainty in Health Care: A Conceptual Taxonomy, 31
MED. DECISION MAKING: AN INT’L J. OF THE SOC’Y FOR MED. DECISION MAKING 828, 828
(2011), http://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X11393976 [https://perma.cc/P9QE-AC3J].
30. See id. Rating agencies believe that hospital M&A activity will continue to
increase because they expect that large for-profit hospitals will continue to have good 
access to credit markets, with an increased likelihood of debt-funded acquisitions, and they
also expect that the largest hospital corporations will direct their cash flow towards
acquisitions.  See, e.g., Richard Daly, More Hospital M&A: Ratings Agencies, HEALTHCARE
FIN. MGMT. ASS’N (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.hfma.org/Content.aspx?Id=45598 [https://perma. 
cc/VS82-U22X].
31. See Lawrence G. Goldberg, Health Care Consolidation and the Changing Health 
Care Marketplace. A View of the Literature and Issues, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Oct. 
1999), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1099ib.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6EV-JHLE] (“Hospitals 
claim that their primary motives are improving efficiency and the quality of care.  The 
empirical evidence on this claim is mixed.”).
32. See Melanie Evans, Reform Update: ACA Will Accelerate Hospital Mergers, 
Moody’s Says, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare. 
com/article/20131023/NEWS/310239966 [https://perma.cc/86PA-XF7E]; see also IRVING LEVIN
ASSOCIATES, INC., THE HEALTH CARE ACQUISITION REPORT (Stephen M. Monroe & Sanford B.
Steever, Ph.D. eds., 18th ed. 2012).




 35. See id.
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to improve care for individuals, improve the health of populations, and 
reduce costs.36 
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the ACA, experts widely recognize 
the ACA as the key catalyst for the recent surge in hospital M&A.37  Although 
hospital M&A is arguably an expected outcome of the healthcare industry— 
declining revenues, large stranded cost structures, and demographics— 
the ACA accelerated these issues.38  Some of the ACA’s changes involve 
competition for individual consumers and the move from fee-for-service 
to value-based reimbursement.39  The ACA changes the old model by
emphasizing patient care and efficiency.40 With an eye towards the ACA’s
reimbursement reductions and shifting business model, which places more
risk on hospitals by increasing the connection of payments to outcomes and
value, hospitals feel major pressure to gain leverage by combining assets,
staff, and resources.41 Many believe the way to best prepare for the ACA’s
new mandated payment systems is through M&A.42
 36. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also Robert King, Economic Impact of Obamacare Hotly Debated, 
WASH. EXAMINER (June 4, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/economic-
impact-of-obamacare-hotly-debated/article/2565578 [https://perma.cc/FL2Z-T6J6].
37. Health experts and empirical studies have widely recognized that tight clinical
and financial integration facilitates accountable, coordinated care. See, e.g., Daniel Casciato, 
Mergers & Acquisitions: What’s in Store for 2016, IH EXECUTIVE (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.
ihexecutive.com/business/article/12145071/mergers-acquisitions-whats-in-store-for-2016
[https://perma.cc/8KJ6-EKER]; Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition in Health 
Care: It Takes Systems To Pursue Quality and Efficiency, HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 7, 2005), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/09/07/hlthaff.w5.420.full.pdf+html 
[https://perma.cc/X5Q3-DCL5].
38. “The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) accelerated a nationwide shift 
towards accountable, coordinated care to further the ‘Triple Aim’ of health care delivery:
higher quality care, at lower costs, while improving population health.”  Brief of Amicus
Curiae America’s Essential Hospitals in Support of Reversal of the District Court at 2, 
Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d
775 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35173), 2014 WL 2958115; see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Casciato, supra note 37. 
39. See Casciato, supra note 37. 
40. Roy Strom, Hospital Mergers Get Caught Between Reform, Competition, CHI.
LAW. MAG. (Dec. 12, 2012), http://chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2012/12/Hospital-
Mergers.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q9CS-EU4R].
41. John Andrews, Hospital Consolidation Rising, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (Mar.
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In any industry, a primary motivator to engage in M&A is the goal of 
reducing costs.43  The healthcare industry is no different.  In actuality,
despite the lack of certainty surrounding the ACA, it seems clear that the
ACA expressly incentivizes M&A activity.  Experts widely accept that 
integration and coordination of care are the best ways to reduce fragmentation, 
increase efficiency, and thus reduce costs.44  The ACA illustrates this by 
its attempt to create more efficient health care delivery systems that are 
entitled to significant monetary benefits over smaller, independent entities.45 
Moreover, the ACA seeks to increase cost efficiency in the delivery of
health care services by promoting a patient-group centered, value-based 
reimbursement model.46  For example, the ACA’s accountable care 
organizations (ACOs), which are specialized collaborative ventures among
healthcare providers, by their very nature influence hospital consolidation 
because if health care organizations create these networks of primary care 
doctors, specialists, and hospitals, they can utilize several income-enhancing 
provisions found in the ACA.47  By allowing ACOs to participate in favorable 
provisions, such as the “Medicare Shared Savings Program,” the ACA
encourages hospital consolidation because hospitals can more efficiently 
manage a large number of enrolled patients in an economically feasible
48manner.
With the ACA’s new model of health care requiring hospitals to cover 
uninsured patients’ expenses and deal with diminishing government
43. This is typically done by combining two firms that were independently operating at
lower than optimal efficiency levels.  See ROBERT B. THOMPSON, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
LAW AND FINANCE 11 (Wolter Kluwers Law & Bus. eds., 2d ed. 2014) (noting that synergy— the
belief that the combination of two companies will produce greater economic efficiency
then the operation of two independent firms—is a major financial incentive to mergers).
44. See Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health 
Care, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/the-strategy-that-will-fix-
health-care [https://perma.cc/62LD-RRYF].
45. See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Consequent Impact 
on Competition in Healthcare: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial
& Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of 
Thomas L. Greaney, Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Dir. of the Center. for Health 
Law Studies, St. Louis Univ. School of Law). 
46. James Ellis & Aaron Razavi, 3 Reasons Why Hospital Mergers are Advantageous, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/3-
reasons-why-hospital-mergers-are-advantageous.
47. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
§ 3022 (2010). Examples such as fee-for-services arrangements, Medicare reimbursements,
and additional bonuses for meeting Section 3022 cost-cutting and quality-care criteria are 
unavailable to physicians and hospitals outside of the ACO network.  Stephen E. Ronai, 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Accountable Care Organization Program:
New Healthcare Disputes and the Increased Need for ADR Services, 66-Oct. DISP. RESOL.
J. 60, 63 (2011). 
48. See Ronai, supra note 47. 
156
     
















     
 
   
       
 
  
   
  
    
 
    
 
  
     
  
 
BAUTISTA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/24/2017 11:48 AM 
[VOL. 54: 149, 2017] Hospital M&A and Antitrust Scrutiny 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
reimbursements, hospitals justify their participation in M&A as a way to 
stay afloat in this new healthcare landscape.49  The ACA also encourages 
hospital consolidation by extending the premiums paid for treatment in 
general hospitals, employing the purchasing power of the Medicare program,
and reforming insurance law to eliminate many of the margins for competition 
between carriers.50  Experts argue that the ACA eliminates many of the
essential competition checks available in the healthcare system, and in
relation to its support of consolidation, the ACA represents a concerted
attempt to prevent competition.51 
Whether critics believe that the ACA is a reaction to, and not a cause
of, hospital consolidation,52 or critics believe that hospital M&A is becoming 
more popular to keep up with the ACA’s goals, amidst this uncertainty
one thing remains clear: this tsunami like wave of hospital mergers is here 
to stay.53  Additionally, regardless of whether we view hospital consolidation 
as a positive development in health care or an unintended consequence of 
the ACA,54 consolidation will certainly raise the issue of competition and 
the application of antitrust law.55 
III. ANTITRUST LAW AND HOSPITAL M&A 
Antitrust law is the study of competition, and it is perhaps the least
understood law of all.56  Justice Scalia once famously quipped, “[i]n law 
school, I never understood [antitrust law].  I later found out, in reading the 
writings of those who do now understand it, that I should not have understood 
it because it did not make any sense then.”57  Antitrust law centers around 
49. See id.
 50. CHRISTOPHER M. POPE, HERITAGE FOUND., BACKGROUNDER NO. 2928, HOW THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FUELS HEALTH CARE MARKET CONSOLIDATION 1 (2014), http://
thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2928.pdf. 
51. See id. at 2.
 52. See Ellis & Razavi, supra note 46 (noting other arguments about the fact that
hospitals are a part of a dynamic industry that has a fixed market share, major capital needs, 
and major needs to continue to provide care to patients in the community).
53. See Casciato, supra note 37. 
54. See Joanne Kenen, Getting the Facts on Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions, ASS’N 
OF HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS, http://healthjournalism.org/resources-tips-details.php?id= 
828#.VvQ69T-kXOo [https://perma.cc/EJ2A-KQQK] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
55. See id.
 56. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 33–39 (2d ed. 2001).
57. Scalia Confirmation Hearing Day 1, C-SPAN (Aug. 5, 1986), http://www.c-span.
org/video/?150300-1/scalia-confirmation-hearing-day-1 [https://perma.cc/3LBV-928F].
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the primary principle that society is better off if markets behave 
competitively.58  Thus, when the market deviates from the competitive ideal, 
antitrust laws play a big role.59  Like the development of general antitrust law,
as we gain new knowledge about the assumptions and dynamics of the
healthcare marketplace, the law’s application to hospital M&A constantly
changed over time.60  Broadly speaking, antitrust law seeks to promote fair
competition on the merits, protect consumers, and protect competitor
businesses from anti-competitive business practices; however, the common
law character of antitrust led to unclear application and uncertain effects.61 
A. Antitrust Law Applied to Hospital Mergers 
As hospitals consolidate with the avowed purpose to keep up with the 
ACA’s goals, the surge in M&A activity caught the attention of antitrust
regulators.62  The Agencies challenge transactions under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.63  The Sherman Anti-trust 
Act of 1890 prohibits conspiracies in the restraint of trade that affect
interstate commerce.64  Section 7 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 
prohibits mergers if they “lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”65 
Consequently, the intentions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section
1 of the Sherman Act differ, but the practical distinction between them is
insignificant.66  Under both, courts generally adjudicate claims under the
same standards.67
 58. WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK
§ 6:7, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016). 
59. See id.  For example, antitrust law seeks to prevent the wrongful acquisition or 
preservation of monopoly power, the abuse of monopoly power to establish a new monopoly,
and the concerted restraints of trade.  Antitrust law also governs proposed mergers and
acquisitions that are sufficiently large to constitute a threat to competition, furthering their
goal of protecting consumers. Id. § 6:5. 
60. See generally id.; see, e.g., POSNER, supra note 56, at 195. 
61. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 1.
 62. See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers
and Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 199 (1997). 
63. See The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014); see also The Clayton Antitrust
Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996). 
64.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014). 
65. Under the Clayton Act, a merger is invalid if it gives a few large firms control
of a particular market, thus trying to reduce the risk of price-fixing and other forms of
illegal collusion.  15 U.S.C. § 18.
66. See 15 U.S.C. §1 (2014); Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital
Mergers and the Transformation of the Hospital Industry, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
93, 142–43 (1988). 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 
1990). For the purpose of this Article, it is not essential to address the Sherman Act and
Clayton Act separately.  Additionally, “[b]ecause the vast majority of transactions are challenged
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The analytical framework that courts apply to hospital mergers also 
applies to any other merger.68 With that said, the evolution and change shown 
by recent developments in antitrust law has resulted in unclear guidelines 
and a world of uncertainty, especially when applied to hospitals.69  The
lack of certainty is demonstrated by antitrust law’s decade-long shift from 
rigid per se rules of illegality to the Rule of Reason analysis.70 
B. The Court’s Early Success Using the Per Se Illegality Approach 
Certain business practices are per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.71  Simply put, a per se violation requires no further inquiry into the
practice’s actual effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals
who engage in the practice.72  As a policy matter, the per se rule of illegality 
clarifies the law by promoting certainty for business planning and promoting 
judicial economy.73 
In the past, courts applied per se illegality to mergers.  This created a 
presumption of illegality for horizontal mergers in concentrated markets 
when, as a result of the merger, the resulting firm controls an undue market 
share and market share concentration significantly increases.74  Courts believed
the inherent likelihood of diminished competition was so great that they
needed to enjoin the mergers unless evidence clearly demonstrated that 
there were no anticompetitive effects.75 
Although per se illegality constantly transformed in cases during the 
1990s, it has the benefit of creating a bright line standard to specific legal 
under both section 7 and section 1, any difference that may exist between these provisions
is only relevant to mergers which are not subject to both section 7 and section 1.  However, 
commentators have argued and at least one court has ruled that section 7 does not apply to
mergers of nonprofit hospitals.” David A. Ettinger & Mark L. Lasser, An Introduction to
Antitrust Merger Analysis (Am. Health Law. Ass’n, 1997). 
68. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE 
OF COMPETITION (July 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/chapter-4-competition-law-
hospitals [https://perma.cc/Z6R9-EJNR] [hereinafter IMPROVING HEALTH CARE].
69. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 1.
70. Abraham L. Wickelgren, Determining the Optimal Antitrust Standard: How to
Think About Per Se Versus Rule of Reason, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 52 (2012). 
71. See 15 U.S.C. §1 (2014). 
72. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
73. See id.
 74. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). 
75. See id; United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
that showing of undue concentration in market for a particular product in a particular
geographic area establishes presumption of illegality). 
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conduct.76  This approach prevents defendants from introducing evidence 
that may establish a business justification, efficiency justification, or a 
procompetitive effect.77  In FTC v. University Health, Inc., the FTC challenged 
a proposed hospital merger by offering evidence of anticompetitive effects of
the University Health, Inc. merger.78  University Health, Inc. rebutted the
FTC’s evidence by arguing that the increased market share from the merger
did not necessarily equal a lessening of competition because the acquired
hospital was weak and not a meaningful competitor.79 The court rejected 
this contention and held that the hospital’s arguments against per se illegality 
were ineffective against the government’s prima facie case.80 
Regardless of how one categorizes many of these cases in principle, in 
decision-theory terms the per se illegality rule represents a conclusive 
presumption.81 In earlier cases, the court tried to present the anticompetitive
presumption as a rebuttable one because it recognized the determination 
of the competitive effects of a proposed merger as a matter of “probabilities, 
not certainties.”82  However, subsequent cases interpreted the clear showing
 76. See Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 321 (discussing the Court’s modification
of the per se rule to make it look more like a quick look approach).
77. See Josh Wright, The Guidelines Should Be Revised to Reject the PNB Structural
Presumption, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Oct. 26, 2009), http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/10/26/ 
the-guidelines-should-be-revised-to-reject-the-pnb-structural-presumption [https://perma.cc/
2ML7-DEHU].
78. The district court rejected the FTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction and,
upon appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision.  See FTC v. Univ. 
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
79. Id. at 1220. 
80. 	See id. The court said:
[w]e are not prepared, on the strength of [the] language [in General Dynamics],
to hold that the acquisition of a “weak company” is absolutely immune from §
7 scrutiny.  Rather, we view General Dynamics as standing for the unremarkable
proposition that a defendant may rebut the government’s prima facie case by
showing that the government’s market share statistics overstate the acquired 
firm’s ability to compete in the future and that, discounting the acquired firm’s 
market share to take this into account, the merger would not substantially lessen
competition. . . . The acquired firm’s weakness, then, is one of many possible
factors that a defendant may introduce to rebut the government’s prima facie
case. It is, however, “probably the weakest ground of all for justifying a
merger.”  Therefore, to ensure that competition and consumers are protected, we 
will credit such a defense only in rare cases, when the defendant makes a 
substantial showing that the acquired firm’s weakness, which cannot be resolved
by any competitive means, would cause that firm’s market share to reduce to a 
level that would undermine the government’s prima facie case.
Id. at 1221. 
81. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) 
(discussing the seminal standard of per se illegality for price fixing); United States v. 
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 399 (1927).
82. Brown Shoe, Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); see United States 
v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360 (1963) (holding that a firm with 30% share 
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rebuttal standard as placing a very high bar for demonstrating that
presumptively unlawful mergers would not reduce competition, thus 
making the standard practically irrefutable.83  As Justice Stewart famously 
stated in his dissent in United States v. Von’s Grocery, “the sole consistency
that . . . can be [found] is that, in [antitrust] litigation under [Section] 7, the 
Government always wins.”84 
In later cases, the courts replaced the clear showing standard with one
that required the defendant to show only that “the prima facie case 
inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s probable effect on future 
competition.”85  This appeared to reduce the burden of proof, but it
remained unclear whether there was a meaningful analytical difference
between lowering the burden of proof and lowering the burden of 
production.86  In United States v. Baker Hughes, the court stated that in 
order to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects, a defendant must
show that the prima facie case inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s
probable effect on future competition.87 
This slight attempt of moving towards clarity still brought uncertainty.
In Baker, the court suggested that a defendant can make the required 
showing by affirmatively demonstrating that a given transaction is unlikely 
to substantially reduce competition, or by discrediting the data underlying 
the initial presumption in the government’s favor.88  Because the government 
can carry its initial burden of production simply by presenting market
concentration statistics using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,89 the court 
noted that allowing the government to rest its case at that point would
grossly inflate the role of statistics in actions brought under Section 7 of
of the market was per se illegal). However, modern economic learning and empirical
evidence does not support the notion that mergers that generate post-merger firm with
greater than 30% share substantially lessen competition. See Wright, supra note 77. 
83. In United States v. Von’s Grocery, the Court held that a merger between the
third and sixth largest grocery companies in Los Angeles, even though their combined
sales only accounted for 7.5% of total sales in Los Angeles, was a violation of antitrust
laws. See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272–77 (1966). 
84. Id. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
85.  United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
86. See Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A 
Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 275 (2015) (discussing the lack of
clarity).
87. See Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991. 
88. See id. at 991–92. 
89. See id. at 989. 
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the Sherman Act.90  Ultimately, the court held that the showing of undue
concentration in a market for a particular product in a particular geographic 
area establishes the presumption of illegality.91 Thus, the lack of clarity 
prevailed when it came to the type of evidence that was needed for each 
of the dueling presumptions and continued to bring uncertainty to antitrust 
litigation. 
Per se illegality—the most unyielding standard of review—has major 
defects, especially in the health-care industry.92  When the courts took this
hardline approach, critics argued that it was too easy for the government 
to prevail in these cases because almost any hospital merger would run 
afoul of concentration benchmarks used to assess the merger’s competitive
effects.93  Additionally, when hospital mergers are at issue, the per se 
assumption that merging entities can control prices is not necessarily 
true.94  Specifically, the per se illegality presumption—that merged hospitals
will have automatic control of prices and will produce anticompetitive 
effects—fails because a hospital’s largest source of revenue comes from 
government payers, who offer set prices to hospitals for their services.95 
Despite the uncertain fit, the underlying thought process of the per se 
illegality approach clearly aided the Agencies in their early success during 
litigation to stop hospital mergers.96 
C. The Court’s Declining Confidence Using the
 
Rule of Reason Approach 

Hospital mergers may create anticompetitive behavior, and at other 
times, encourage competition within the market.  Understanding that bright-
line tests put restraints on a party’s freedom of action and may in fact defeat 
the Sherman Act’s underlying purpose, courts turned to the Sherman Act’s
 90. Id. at 986.  There are also many important issues surrounding the market definition
and defined geographic market that evolved. See, e.g., id. at 982. 
91. See Baker, supra note 66, at 142–43. 
92. See id.
 93. See Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., Federal Antitrust Merger Enforcement Standards: 
A Good Fit for the Hospital Industry?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 137, 149 (1995); 
Fredric J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate Antitrust
Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 115–16 (1994); David L. Glazer, Clayton Act Scrutiny
of Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: The Wrong Rx for Ailing Institutions, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 
1055 (1991).
94. See United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp. & Swedish Am. Corp., 898 F.2d 
1278, 1283–1285 (7th Circ. 1990) (noting that higher market shares make it easier for firms in
market to collude, and thereby force prices above competition levels).
95. See Entin, supra note 93, at 128. 
96. Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, Competition Among Hospitals, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 764, 764–65 (2003). 
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text to show its “generality and adaptability” in its application.97  Thus,
accepting the lack of clarity when dealing with hospitals, courts moved
away from the per se illegality approach to a more flexible approach, the
Rule of Reason.  Under the Rule of Reason, the act of a merger is not
illegal per se, but rather the legality of the merger depends upon the
reasonableness—or lack thereof—of the predicted impact of the merger.98 
The Rule of Reason is a more holistic approach; it allows courts to gauge 
whether the restraint or merger is reasonable.99  The Rule of Reason requires 
a determination of the particular facts of each case, possibly considering 
the intent of the conduct and the method used to obtain control over 
competition.100 Courts expanded the Rule of Reason to balance the welfare-
enhancing effects of consolidation, such as the creation of efficiencies,
against welfare-reducing effects.101 
Generally, a full Rule of Reason analysis evaluates the purpose and the 
effect of the allegedly anticompetitive behavior.102  Although there are 
complexities within each step, especially when evaluating hospital mergers,
the Rule of Reason can be broken down into three steps. 103  The first step 
is to determine whether the defendant has market power in a defined 
relevant market for goods or services, and whether the defendant has used 
that market power to adversely affect competition through increased
prices or decreased output.104  The market analysis question is the primary 
distinguishing factor between the Rule of Reason and the per se illegality
analysis.  In a Rule of Reason analysis, the practical result of the first
 97. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) (emphasizing 
that the Sherman Act “set[s] up the essential standard of reasonableness”).
98. Heather R. Spang et al., Hospital Mergers and Savings for Consumers: Exploring 
New Evidence, 20 HEALTH AFF. 150, 150 (2001), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/ 
20/4/150.long.
99. See id.
 100. A good intention, however, will not evade scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act
if an unreasonable restraint is either its intent or effect. See Entin, supra note 93, at 128– 
29. 
101. See id.
 102. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 125 (1984).
103. Hospital merger analysis raises a number of significant issues, including how best
to define the geographic and product markets, assess the prospects for entry and the likelihood 
and magnitude of efficiencies, and determine the relevance of a hospital’s institutional 
status (for-profit or nonprofit). See IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 68, at 20–29. 
104. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) 
(noting that the temporary and limited loss of competition is outweighed by long term 
benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself).
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requirement is that defendants usually prevail because plaintiffs must spend
significant time, effort, and money to prove their case.105  If the plaintiff 
meets these requirements, the second step of the Rule of Reason shifts the 
burden to the defendant to prove the challenged merger has procompetitive 
justifications.106  Although the type of evidence required to meet the burden 
is unclear, if the defendant meets this burden, the third step of the analysis 
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff must prove the merger 
is not reasonably necessary to attain the procompetitive justifications or 
that a less anticompetitive alternative may be used to attain the procompetitive
justification.107 
Even though courts previously had success in preventing hospital mergers, 
the lack of certainty surrounding the healthcare industry and the lack of 
clarity when applying antitrust laws to hospitals caused significant change
to antitrust enforcement regarding mergers in the healthcare area.108  From
the 1990s to early 2000s, courts increasingly accepted various justifications, 
like potential cost savings, as a sufficient basis for allowing hospital mergers.109 
Between 1994 and 2000, there were approximately nine hundred hospital 
mergers and only seven litigated antitrust challenges; the Agencies lost every 
single challenge, which revealed the courts’ confusion about how to handle 
hospital antitrust cases.110 
During this wave, the FTC struggled to meet the definitions embedded 
in antitrust law, and judges were reluctant to enforce antitrust principles 
on certain hospital transactions.  For example, in FTC v. Butterworth Health, 
105. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches
to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 691 (1991) (explaining that plaintiffs face a 
“significant disadvantage” and are often deterred from filing valid claims).
106. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing
the steps of the rule of reason analysis).
107. See id.
 108.  See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1303 (W.D. Mich.1996); 
United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated 
as moot, 107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 
1228 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995). 
109. See Spang et al., supra note 98. 
110. Gaynor & Vogt, supra note 96, at 764–65. The seven cases were: California v. 
Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085–1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d mem., 217
F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000), revised, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v. Tenet 
Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948–49 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev’d, 186 F.3d 1045, 
1055 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 
149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302–04
(W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mercy Health 
Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot 107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th 
Cir. 1997); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1228 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69
F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. 224, 315 (1994). 
State antitrust enforcers without either Agency’s involvement brought one of the seven
cases. See Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 
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the court denied the FTC’s motion for an injunction and allowed Butterworth 
Health to merge with Blodgett Memorial Medical Center despite finding 
that the merger created a surviving entity with near-monopoly status in
two relevant markets.111  Setting aside controversy surrounding the market
definition issue, the opinion opened new avenues in antitrust analysis of 
hospital mergers as a basis for overcoming the presumption of illegality.112 
Although the court dismissed consumer surveys that had questionable 
reliability, the court ultimately held that the defendants successfully rebutted
the FTC’s prima facie case and additional evidence of likely harm.113 
This revolutionary case showed how the lack of clarity troubled courts
when evaluating hospital mergers.  The courts’ antitrust analysis shifted
towards permitting open-ended inquiry into the competitive consequences 
of mergers unaided by meaningful presumptive rules.114  In Butterworth, 
the court considered the nonprofit status of the hospitals, the community
commitment undertaken by the merged entity, and the efficiencies resulting 
from the merger to determine that the proposed merger was not likely to 
cause anticompetitive effects.115  The court claimed that there was a plausible
basis in the record for each conclusion; however, scholars later questioned 
the court’s factual premise for each factor.116 
Eroding the impact of previously used legal doctrine, the decision in 
this case made the outcome of litigation highly uncertain.117  Lacking sound 
economic and policy research, observers criticized antitrust laws on the 
grounds that they relied too heavily on presumptions, rules, and norms 
based on neoclassical theory.118 The court’s Rule of Reason analysis represented 
its uncertainty as a whole, and showed the lack of clarity embedded in
antitrust law and its application to hospitals.  The never-ending pursuit of 
111. See Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1300–01.
112. The district court agreed with the FTC’s relevant product and geographic markets
and provided a helpful step forward in refining hospital merger analysis by identifying two
product markets: (1) the general acute care inpatient hospital services market; and (2) a 
market consisting of primary care impatient hospital services. Id. at 1290; see id. at 1300. 
For example, the Court balanced the nonprofit status of the merged hospital and the 
parties’ prospective commitments. Id. at 1296–97. 
113. See id. at 1302. 
114. See Greaney, supra note 62, at 214. 
115. See Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1302. 
116. See Greaney, supra note 62, at 214. 
117. Id. at 192, 214 (explaining the uncertainty when litigating antitrust hospital merger 
cases, hence the title Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and Antitrust 
Law).
118. See Spang et al., supra note 98, at 150. 
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IV. THE QUEST FOR CLARITY
As the healthcare industry confronts a range of new and different pressures 
from previous years, hospitals continue to look towards the self-help remedy 
of M&A as means to spur growth, improve care, cut costs, and strengthen 
their competitive position.120  Meanwhile, in keeping with the explosive
growth of regulatory oversight of business activities in the past decade,
the Agencies continue to scrutinize the effects of hospital M&A.121 
Considering the Agencies’ series of failed attempts in challenging hospital
mergers in the mid-1990s to early 2000s, the Agencies realized that the 
template for trying hospital mergers no longer works.122 
Accordingly, the Agencies began to make changes.  In 2002, the FTC 
established a new merger litigation task force to reinvigorate the FTC’s 
hospital merger program.123 The task force screens targets, selects the best 
cases, and develops strategies by taking a hard look at which strategies
worked and which did not in prior hospital cases.124  In 2010, the Agencies 
also revised their horizontal merger guidelines, signaling the FTC’s move 
to a more flexible fact-based approach that deemphasizes the complicated,
theoretical task of the relevant market definition.125 Although its intent
 119. See id. at 157. 
120. See id. at 150. 
121. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Everything Old is New 
Again: Healthcare and Competition in the 21st Century, Remarks Before the Seventh Annual 
Competition in Healthcare Forum, at 19–20 (Nov. 7, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/everything-old-new-again-health-care-and-competition-21st- 
century/murishealthcarespeech0211.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MH3-XG3Q]. 
122. The federal courts throughout the United States repeatedly rejected the FTC
attempts to block hospital mergers.  For example, the Eighth Circuit denied two FTC challenges
on grounds that the FTC failed to meet its burden of establishing the relevant geographic 
market because the FTC’s alleged geographic markets were too narrow. See FTC v. Tenet 
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053–54 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 
F.3d 260, 268–72 (8th Cir. 1995). 
123. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Announces




125. The 2010 update modified the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines that describe
the factors used by the Agencies in analyzing “horizontal” mergers among competitors. 
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https:// 
perma.cc/4CF2-ZQEY].
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was likely different, the FTC’s changes created even more uncertainty for 
hospitals attempting to predict whether the FTC will claim that a merger 
violates Section 7, and added to the court’s confusion when applying the 
law.126 
The role of antitrust law in monitoring the healthcare industry faces 
increasing uncertainty, and perhaps diminishing returns.127  Experts continue
to criticize the antitrust environment, while the United States places 
unprecedented reliance on competition to reduce costs and assure quality 
in our convoluted health care system.128  As a result, the dependence on 
antitrust enforcement in the healthcare industry has never been greater as 
providers increasingly undertake M&A and other forms of consolidation 
to integrate care and achieve greater efficiency, thereby creating concerns
of lessening competition.129 
Earlier in history, when courts applied the principles of per se illegality, 
courts represented themselves as have having a deep understanding of the 
healthcare industry and stopped hospital mergers dead in their tracks.130 
As time progressed, pressures changed and evidence began to confuse courts 
when they applied its rigid approach.131  Next, courts began to apply the
Rule of Reason, opening floodgates to various counterarguments and
allowing potentially anticompetitive hospital transactions because of their 
avowed benefits.132  As the threat of hospital M&A increased, the Agencies
began retrospective studies of consummated hospital mergers as an attempt 
to emphasize the importance of relying on real-world empirical evidence, 
instead of hunches, guesswork, and theoretical predictions.133  The result 
of these studies aided the FTC to successfully challenge the consummated
acquisition of High Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Hospital, which 
portended a reboot of healthcare merger enforcement.134
 126. See, Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines From Hedgehog to 
Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 55–60 (2010) (explaining why the FTC originally
believed the 2010 guidelines would create more, rather than less, judicial certainty).
127. Robert F. Leibenluft, Antitrust and Provider Collaborations: Where We’ve 
Been and What Should Be Done Now, 4 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 845, 871 (2015). 
128. See id. at 872. 
129. See id.
 130. See Wickelgren, supra note 70, at 52. 
131. See id. at 54. 
132. See generally FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986)
(discussing the two analytical approaches).
133. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 776–81 (1991). 
134. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Rules that Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare Corp.s Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital Was Anticompetitive
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A. The Move Along the Continuum—The Quick Look 
Since the Northern District of Illinois issued its decision in Evanston in 
2008, the FTC has won five out of five litigated hospital merger challenges.135 
Additionally, signals from the Agencies are clear: they will continue to 
challenge hospital mergers and are ready to defend their position in court.136 
But where does this newfound confidence and its related successes come 
from?  Rather than taking a strict categorical approach applying per se
illegality or the Rule of Reason, courts are moving along the analytical 
continuum by using a quick look approach to facilitate the Agencies’ efforts 
to stop hospital mergers. 
The quick look is not a new category of analysis.137  Instead, it is an approach
that courts are using to move away from reliance upon fixed categories 
and more towards a continuum.138 Courts typically apply the quick look 
approach in situations when they can easily ascertain the substantial likelihood 
of anticompetitive effects.139  The quick look is advantageous in situations
where actors take anticompetitive steps and proffer no plausible justification,
(Aug. 6, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/08/commission-
rules-evanston-northwestern-healthcare-corps [https://perma.cc/3V3J-T9JD] (holding that the
evidence presented by complaint counsel “demonstrate[ed] that the transaction enabled 
the merged firm to exercise market power and that the resulting anticompetitive effects
were not offset by merger-specific efficiencies.”); see also In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare 
Corp., No. 9315, slip op. at 90 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2007/08/070806opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/USZ4-SFLK] (imposing
“an injunctive remedy that requires respondent to establish separate and independent negotiating
teams” instead of mandating divestiture).
135. In re Evanston Nw. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 268 F.R.D. 56, 87 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
(denying the hospital’s motion to dismiss the FTC’s complaint).  The FTC’s wins include 
three mergers that were preliminarily enjoined by a federal court. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney
Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 749 F.3d 559,
573 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 
2012).
136. Nathan Hawthorne & Kelly Signs, Notable Trends in Merger Review: Inside
the HSR Annual Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 12, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://www. 
ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/08/notable-trends-merger-review-inside- 
hsr-annual-report [https://perma.cc/M4CA-TKXK].
137. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting
that the court is not moving from a dichotomy to a trichotomy). 
138. In California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, Justice Ginsburg added that the “quick look” 
is not a new category of analysis that is an intermediate position between “per se”
condemnation and a full-blown “rule of reason” analysis and further noted that the 
Supreme Court has not moved from a “dichotomy” to a “trichotomy,” but instead, has backed
away from any reliance upon fixed categories and has moved towards a continuum.  Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S.
at 779). 
139. Notably, the quick look analysis applies when an “observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have
any anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770. 
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or only very weak justifications, for their conduct.140  Unlike the per se 
illegality and Rule of Reason analysis,141 the logic and value of taking a
quick look saves time and money by not requiring a full market analysis.142 
The quick look analysis is similar in nature to the Rule of Reason; 
however, it is much more advantageous for the Agencies in hospital merger 
cases. Generally, under the quick look approach the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant violated antitrust laws.143  A plaintiff can do this without
defining the relevant market, showing market power, or proving actual 
anticompetitive effects, which promotes implicit bias from the court.  Then,
the defendant has the opportunity to prove a plausible explanation, but 
such explanation is subject to scrutiny by the court.144 Compared to the
Rule of Reason, the quick look decreases the amount of detail and analysis
the court requires when forming a conclusion but still has the appearance 
of giving defendants the opportunity to justify their behavior.145  To shed 
light on the court’s recent approach to enjoin hospital mergers, the following 
140. See id.
141. The per se illegality analysis requires courts to generalize about the utility of a
challenged practice and reduces the cost of decision-making but correspondingly raises 
the total cost of error that may have negative effects on the health-care industry. See, e.g., 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc., 
v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)).  The Rule of Reason analysis requires an
exhaustive inquiry into all the myriad factors and increases litigation costs.  See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1984) (“When everything 
is relevant, nothing is dispositive. . . . Litigation costs are the product of vague rules
combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust
litigation under the Rule of Reason.”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and 
Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 800 (1987). 
142. Catherine Verschedlen, Is the Quick-Look Antitrust Analysis in Polygram Holding
Inherently Suspect?, 32 J. CORP. L. 447, 464 (2007). 
143. Id. at 452. 
144. “If the defendant does offer such an explanation, then the Commission ‘must 
address the justification’ in one of two ways.  First, the Commission may explain why it 
can confidently conclude, without adducing evidence, that the restraint very likely harmed
consumers.  Alternatively, the Commission may provide the tribunal with sufficient evidence
to show that anticompetitive effects are in fact likely.  If the Commission succeeds in either
way, then the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show the restraint in fact does 
not harm consumers or has ‘procompetitive virtues’ that outweigh its burden upon consumers.” 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting In re PolyGram
Holding, 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003)).
145. See id.
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B. Courts Are Taking a Quick Look at Hospital Mergers 
In St. Luke’s Health System, the FTC, State of Idaho, and local hospitals 
brought an action against two health care providers alleging that the providers’ 
merger violated antitrust laws.147  According to the joint complaint, the
combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give the combined entity the 
market power to demand higher prices for health care services provided 
by primary care physicians in Nampa, Idaho, and surrounding areas, ultimately
leading to higher costs for health care consumers.148 Even though the
“district court expressly noted the troubled state of the U.S. health care
system, found that St. Luke’s and Saltzer genuinely intended to move toward
a better health care system, and expressed its belief that the merger would 
improve patient outcomes if left intact,” the court still held that the acquisition 
violated antitrust laws, and ordered St. Luke’s to fully divest itself of
Saltzer’s physicians and assets.149  An appeal followed, and the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and conclusions 
of law de novo.150 
The court’s analysis in St. Luke’s resembled the court’s analysis in 
Polygram. First, under the quick look approach, the court determines whether 
it is obvious from the nature of the challenged conduct that it will likely
harm consumers.151 In Polygram, instead of referring to the inherent nature
of the actual conduct, the court looked at the similarity of the conduct to 
another practice that the FTC recognized as per se illegal.152  If the conduct
appears likely to restrict competition and decrease output absent an efficiency
justification, it is presumed unreasonable and deemed inherently suspect.153
 146. Compare id. at 32 (holding that the FTC was correct in following the analytical 
path that it established in In Re Massachusetts Board of Optometry dubbed as the “quick
look” analysis); with St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 
778 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2015).
147. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d at 781. 
148. See id. at 782 (noting that the district court consolidated the FTC and the State 
of Idaho complaint that was filed in March 2013 with the complaint filed by a private 
hospital in the District Court of Idaho in November 2012). 
necessarily from anything ‘inherent’ in a business practice but from the close family resemblance 
149. See id.
 150. See id.
 151. 
152. 
PolyGram Holding, Inc., 416 F.3d at 35. 
See id. at 37 (explaining that “the rebuttable presumption of illegality arises not 
between the suspect practice and another practice that already stands convicted in the court 
of consumer welfare”).
153. See id. at 35–36. 
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In St. Luke’s, the court said the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 
case that a merger is anticompetitive.154 Instead of evaluating and weighing 
all the data equally, the court viewed this transaction with a bias that the 
merger was inherently suspect.  For example, the court held that the plaintiffs
proved Nampa was the relevant market because 68% of Nampa residents
get their primary care from providers who are located in Nampa.155  The
court also gave weight to the plaintiffs’ expert witness who said commercial 
health plans need to include Nampa primary care physicians (PCP) in their
networks to offer a competitive product.156  Conversely, the court did not
consider the defendants’ undisputed evidence from a natural experiment that
concluded consumers could and would obtain PCP services outside of Nampa 
in the event of anticompetitive prices.157 
On appeal, St. Luke’s argued that the district court erred by considering 
only the current behavior of Nampa consumers.158  While the court agreed 
that the geographic market definition involves prospective analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit held there was no clear error in the district court’s determination.159 
The district court considered the mere probabilities provided by the plaintiffs, 
and basically ignored the defendants’ statistical evidence and avowed
certainties opposing the anticompetitive effects of the merger.160 
The court’s analysis and biased reasoning, paired with the standard of 
review, illustrates the quick look approach courts are starting to use.  For 
example, in St. Luke’s, the district court found no evidence of potential
anticompetitive price increases in the market.161  Instead, the district court 
found that anticompetitive effects were likely based on hypothetical price 
increases for ancillary services, and not adult PCP services.162  The Ninth 
Circuit stated, “The problem with this conclusion is that the district court 
made no findings about St. Luke’s market power in the ancillary services 
154. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d at 783. 
155. Brief of Appellants at 18, St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health
Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35173), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/cases/140612briefofappellants.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH2B-6M76]. 
156. Id.
157.  The natural experiment occurred when Micron, a major regional employer, put 
a tiered network structure in place that caused its employees to pay more to see Saltzer and St.
Luke’s PCPs, which resulted in substantial numbers of Micron employees obtaining PCP 
services from providers outside of Nampa. See id. at 18–19. 
158. 
159. 
 St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d at 785. 
See id.
 160. See id.
 161.  See Brief of Appellants, supra note 155, at 36. 
162. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d at 787. 
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market. Absent such a finding, it is difficult to conclude that the merged
entity could easily demand anticompetitive prices for such services.”163 
The court then stated,  “wholly aside from these conceptual difficulties, the
factual underpinnings of the district court’s conclusion are suspect.”164 
Thus, despite the fact that the defendant provided a large amount of the 
evidence, in theory, the court took a quick look by concluding that the 
merger would likely harm consumers without adducing evidence of these 
effects.165  Analogous to the quick look approach, the court found that the
high level of Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) established the prima facie
case and pointed to arbitrary evidence of anticompetitive effects, despite 
being outside of the defined market, to shift the evidentiary burden.166 
Although the parties presented evidence and testimony in support of 
both sides, the court ostensibly applied the inherently suspect categorization 
to the St. Luke Hospital merger to create a rebuttable presumption of
illegality.167  Under the quick look approach, unless the defendant then
comes forward with a plausible and legally cognizable competitive justification 
for the restraint, the court summarily condemns it.168 
Once the burden shifts under the quick look approach, the defendant must 
produce evidence that the transaction will in fact produce procompetitive 
effects.169  In St. Luke’s, the district court found that the merger was designed 
to, and would succeed in, promoting the procompetitive goal of integrated 
healthcare.170  The court also noted that the transaction was intentionally
structured to maximize consumer benefits and would succeed at improving 
163. Id.
 164. Id. 
165. 
166. 
See Polygram Holding, Inc., 416 F.3d at 36. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of
market concentration, calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in
a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. See Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (July 29, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-
index [https://perma.cc/V7VL-EUGM].  The Supreme Court has cautioned that statistics 
reflecting market concentration are not conclusive indicators of anticompetitive effects. 
See United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
167. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 155, at 19. 
168. A proper justification had to illustrate “why practices that are competitively
suspect as a general matter may not be expected to have adverse consequences in the context
of the particular market in question; or they may consist of reasons why the practices are 
likely to have beneficial effects.” Polygram Holding, Inc., 416 F.3d at 29. 
169. Kenneth G. Starling, Increasing the FTC’s Burden: Quick Look Verse Full Rule
of Reason, CORPS., SEC. & ANTITRUST PRAC. GROUP (The Federalist Soc’y, Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 1, 1999, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/increasing-the-ftcs-burden-
quick-look-versus-full-rule-of-reason [https://perma.cc/QC8F-6ERF].
170. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 155, at 46.  The defendants explained that 
there is no dispute in academic literature or in federal policy that integration in health care 
benefits consumers by giving rise to higher-quality and higher-value care. Id. 
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patient outcomes.171 Instead of balancing the benefits of the merger against
the likelihood of anticompetitive effects to determine whether the transaction 
was valid, the court simply disregarded the undisputed benefits by deeming
them not “merger-specific.”172 
Although the justifications provided in Polygram were different,173 the
court in St. Luke’s took the same vague approach after it decided the
defendants failed to proffer a “cognizable” justification and subsequently
ceased its analysis.174  After disregarding evidence demonstrating that the
efficiencies benefiting patients and physicians were not “merger-specific,”
the court’s analysis rested almost exclusively on aspirational generalities 
about physicians and made no effort to determine, on the evidence, whether 
the hospitals could achieve the benefits otherwise.175  In both cases, the
courts showed great bias against the claimed efficiencies.  In St. Luke’s,
the court held that a transaction that lessens competition or creates monopolies 
is not excused from antitrust law simply because the transaction can improve 
its operations.176 
Instead of objectively looking at the facts and evidence of the case to 
weigh the anticompetitive effects with the justifications provided by the
plaintiff, the court in St. Luke’s made a policy judgment resembling the 
quick look analysis used in Polygram. The court failed to apply the main
goal of antitrust law—to enhance consumer welfare—and approached the 
case with a bias presuming the merger’s anticompetitive effects despite 
opposing evidence.  The court’s bias in St. Luke’s resembles the per se
171. St. Luke’s argued that the merger would benefit patients by creating a team of 
employed physicians with access the electronic medical records system that St. Luke’s
used. Id.
 172. See St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775,
789–91 (9th Cir. 2015).
173. Polygram’s proffered justification was that the moratoriums increased the three 
recordings’ long-term profitability and enhanced the Three Tenors Brand, thus preventing 
free riding from the market of the joint recording.  PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC., 416
F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  Although the court may have had to engage in more searching
analysis of the market circumstances and that there was in fact a harm to competition, the 
FTC noted that the showing requires neither proof of actual anticompetitive effect nor full 
market analysis. Id. at 33. 
174. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d at 791–92. 
175. Id. at 791; see also Brief of Appellants, supra note 155, at 48. 
176. In Polygram, the court noted that a restraint cannot be justified solely on the 
ground that it increases the profitability of the enterprise that introduces the new product, 
regardless of whether that enterprise is a joint venture or a solo pledge. See Polygram Holding, 
Inc., 416 F.3d at 38; see also St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d at 792. 
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illegality analysis requiring a showing of mere possibility or resemblance 
to anticompetitive behavior.177 Although the court moved along the continuum
towards the Rule of Reason by allowing St. Luke’s to provide a case of rebuttal, 
the court set a high standard by requiring St. Luke’s to produce convincing
proof of significant and merger-specific benefits to successfully rebut the
presumption of illegality.178 
The fact that the court required a higher standard of proof for showing
efficiencies than for showing anticompetitive effects enabled the court to
give a quick look at the evidence without really considering its weight before
coming to a conclusion.  Additionally, the Court practically ignored the 
demonstration of actual procompetitive effects before validating the mere 
speculations provided by the plaintiff.  This oversight of efficiencies and
bias during the balancing step equates to the court applying a quick look
approach when analyzing hospital merger cases.179 Whether the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent approach resulted from political pressures or newfound 
expertise with hospital mergers, applying this analysis with an eye towards 
the biased notion of a hospital merger’s illegality may produce profound 
effects by foreclosing innovation in the healthcare market that may increase 
efficiency and reduce costs.180 
Accordingly, hospitals face a growing need to demonstrate and explain 
how their mergers or acquisitions are procompetitive and will benefit 
consumers.  Even though the Agencies may use anticipatory broad concepts,
hospitals may not use broad evidence of procompetitive effects through
efficiencies.181 Instead, hospitals must prepare sharper-focused, well-
177. See discussion supra Part III.B (describing the per se illegality approach applied by
courts).
178. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d at 791–92. 
179. Judge Easterbrook once explained that a court should err on the side of allowing
conduct because the market will typically self-correct any anticompetitive effects, while a 
judgment erroneously prohibiting precompetitive behavior will create significant and
long-term societal costs. He further noted that “wisdom lags far behind the market” and 
firms must be allowed to experiment with innovative practices. Easterbrook, supra note 
141, at 2–7. 
180. It is practically impossible for a health care system operating in a mid-sized
market to merge where the scale necessary to form an integrated delivery system entails a 
substantial market share.  It is even more difficult now because the court reasoned that 
there is no case in which the benefits of integrated care could be deemed “merger-specific”
due to the theoretical possibility that independent physicians could simply work together
as a “committed team.” See Brief of Appellants, supra note 155, at 52. 
181. See FTC Scores a Big Victory Challenge to Hospital-Physician Practice Deal, 
ADVISORY BD. (Feb. 17, 2015, 10:06 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/
2015/02/17/ftc-scores-a-big-victory [https://perma.cc/MU2N-WTMJ] (quoting an attorney that 
said, “[j]ust stating that you’re merging to better patient outcomes to achieve the goals of 
the [ACA]—that you somehow intend to gain cost efficiencies without providing the flesh
to that argument—[is] not going to work under antitrust laws”).
174
     




















BAUTISTA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/24/2017 11:48 AM 
[VOL. 54: 149, 2017] Hospital M&A and Antitrust Scrutiny 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
developed evidence of procompetitive effects and document their intentions 
properly when structuring a merger.  If their transaction is challenged, they
need evidence to push the court’s analysis along the continuum towards a 
full Rule of Reason analysis, rather than allowing the court to use a quick 
look approach that leans towards per se illegality.  Contemplating the court’s
recent quick look approach, it is crucial that hospitals perform considerable
due diligence to evaluate transaction costs, benefits, and risks before
considering M&A.
CONCLUSION
The healthcare industry is full of uncertainty.  Considering the political 
debate and uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. health care, it will 
likely remain this way for a long time.  There is a lack of empirical evidence, 
and the studies that do exist show conflicting evidence of the ACA’s effect
on hospital mergers and the overall effect of hospital M&A.  Moreover, 
courts continue to add to the uncertainty.  Despite the Agencies’ attempts,
antitrust regulation is increasingly convoluted and misunderstood.  The 
waves of hospital mergers and ensuing litigation have created uncertain
outcomes that frustrate the industry.
It is important to understand the evolution of the courts’ approach when 
analyzing hospital mergers.  Courts no longer analyze hospital mergers 
categorically using per se illegality or the Rule of Reason, but instead slide 
along the analytical continuum using a quick look approach to scrutinize 
hospital M&A.  Effectively, courts focus only on the possible anticompetitive 
considerations of hospital mergers, while ignoring evidence of the widely
accepted wisdom in healthcare that integration and coordination are the best 
ways to reduce fragmentation, increase efficiency, and thus reduce costs.
While the never-ending quest for clarity amidst uncertainty continues, one 
thing remains clear—hospital antitrust challenges will continue to add to 
the uncertainty of the healthcare industry.
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